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CHAPTER SEVEN 
From autarky to  the European  Union: nationalist 
economic policies in twentieth-century Spain 
Gabriel Tortella and Stefan Houpt 
INTRODUCTION 
Discussions related to the concept of nationalism have given rise to a 
great deal of recent academic work not only in Spain but also in most 
of Europe. Part of this is due to the fall of the Iron Curtain, which has 
led to the kindling of nationalist cinders still  alive  in former eastern 
European countries. A second element has been the growing federalism 
in western Europe. More and more decision-making power has been 
delegated either to a  supranational or to a  municipal level,  thereby 
putting national policies into jeopardy. The different formulae of nation-
alism that have evolved in the past have led to additional confusion relat-
ing to the concept itself A mininial definition of nationalism includes at 
least four overlapping meanings: patriotism, a world order based on the 
right of each nation to determine its policies unhindered by others, a 
struggle for national independence, and a system demanding national 
conduct of all industries. Each of the above phenomena is  present to 
some extent in the recent history of Spain, although it is  perhaps the 
latter one which best defines the most determinant of the four:  'eco-
nomic nationalism' - a strain that went hand in hand with economic 
backwardness in Spain throughout part of the nineteenth and most of 
the twentieth century. 
The concept of nationalism has evolved considerably in the last two 
centuries. Originally, the, French ~evolutionaries put the nation before 
the patrimonial state of the absol~te monarchy. The nation therefore was 
the embodiment of popular sovereignty, the set of free, equal and fra-
ternal citizens. From this a  new ideology was created during the nine-
teenth century, to promote the political and social cohesion of newer 
nation states such as Italy and Germany or to contribute to the socio-
economic  unllcation. and  integration  of  peripheral  states  such  as 
Poland, Hungary or Spain. In both cases it had a common function -
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detracting attention from internal conflicts, be they of an ethnic, social, 
political, regional or economic nature. The driving force behind nation-
alism aimed at establishing a common identity with which to overcome 
the antagonisms of opposing forces such as traditionalism and modern-
ism, capitalists and proletarians, centralism and regionalism, and other 
centripetal and centrifugal struggles that arose in the absence of absolut-
ism and with the rise of reason. 
Spanish nationalism can be characterised in this sense, although over 
time  Spain  has  also  developed  a  secondary strain of nationalism -
regional in nature - located in the Basque country, in Catalonia and 
more recently in Galicia and Valencia. These are autonomist, separatist 
or independentist movements of geographic regions of the peninsula 
limited to those areas. Such regionalisms have contributed and may still 
contribute to reinforcing central economic nationalism. 
THE  SHAPING  OF  NATIONALISM 
The more immediate origins of Spanish nationalism can be situated at 
the end of the eighteenth century. Geographical proximity and political 
affinity generated a great interest for the social and political happenings 
in France, which in turn were bound to shake the fundamental pillars of 
the ancien  regime:  the monarchy, the Church and the existing social ties. 
Joseph Bonaparte's assumption of the Spanish crown and the occupa-
tion of Spain by the French army led to a 'war of independence' against 
France, which united the geographical area of Spain under the common 
goals of freedom  and sovereignty.  The struggle  against the common 
enemy united forces - those in favour of simple restoration with those in 
favour of a more liberal political system with sovereignty placed in the 
hands of the people. This unanimous and spontaneous expression of 
sovereignty in defiance of French occupation was the first declaration of 
national unity for a geographical area that had been - until then - the 
centre of an empire ruled by a sovereign king. 
A decade later, with the loss of its colonies, Spain had evolved de ficto 
from an empire to a nation but with elements of social and political 
discord  increasing throughout the  century.  Feudalism  had been dis-
solved, freedom from mortmain  both in ecclesiastic and common land 
could have left a  reserve  army of industrial labour - a precondition 
for industrialisation and modern agrarian production. Unfortunately, 
agrarian modernisation remained strongly limited by low soil  quality, 
exiguous  average  rainfall,  transhumant institutions;  all  these  factors From autarky to  the European Union: Spain  129 
made technologies  developed in northern and central Europe inap-
propriate for Mediterranean agriculture, and agriculture remained stag-
nant.1 
The  unification  of  Spain  had not been a  product of  economic 
integration and the natural formation of a national market but rather 
the result of a century of administrative centralism, the war against 
France and the creation of an army. The railway network, public educa-
tion, conversion to the metric system, common law, and monetary and 
fiscal  reform  were  steps  taken  throughout  the  nineteenth  century 
towards  the  gradual  integration  of  markets  while  avoiding  radical 
reform. 
THE  ORIGINS  OF  PROTECTIONISM 
This process of nation-building was tied to that of constructing a high 
wall of protectionism. The seed of tariff protection flourished under 
liberals and absolutists during the first half of the nineteenth century. 
Liberal, free-trade economic policies in Spain between 1869 and 1891, 
however,  followed  the well-beaten path of similar policies in Europe. 
The liberal two-tier tariff system introduced by the Tariff Law of 1869 
(usually known by the name of its sponsor, the then Finance Minister 
Laureano Figuerola) combined a lower tariff system - no prohibitions 
and an average protection of between 20 and 35 per cent - with a mech-
anism of bilateral trade agreements which allowed Spain twenty-two 
years of trade expansion and substantial foreign investment. Article 5 of 
the Figuerola Tariff  Law established a gradual reduction of tariff  protec-
tion to a maximum IS per cent level to be reached by 188r. 
In the early 1860s French entrepreneurs contributed to the develop-
ment of the nascent Spanish banking system, while channelling foreign 
funds  into  railway  construction.2  A  ten-year  exemption  on  railway 
material and rolling stock established by the Railway Law of 1855 pro-
voked an outcry about lost opportunities for the Spanish iron industry. 
The 'millions made by foreigners' thesis was to become one of the key-
stones of nationalism and of putting the blame for backwardness on 
others. 
Even so,  a few  Spaniards had amassed fortunes during this period. 
The iron-ore mining elite in Biscay fed the Bessemer boom in Europe 
and the United States, wine merchants quenched phylloxera-stricken 
markets in France, and Catalan textile producers wove  a tight net on 
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was seen as coming to an end as the protectionist tide swept over Europe 
and foreign markets closed to Spanish products. The Great Depression 
(1873-95), the massive imports of overseas grains and rearmament had 
led Europe to a return to protectionism. Germany, Austria-Hungary, 
Italy, Switzerland, Sweden, Portugal, Belgium, Russia and France raised 
barriers before Spain tardily set out to follow their example. The renewal 
of tariff protectionism in Spain was initiated with the Royal Decree of 
31 December I89I. This new regulation increased the general level of 
tariffs substantially but maintained two important exceptions: low tariffs 
on the imports of railway materials and debenture of duties paid on 
ship-building materials. 
THE  QUESTION  OF  NATIONAL DEFENCE 
In the world arena liberalism was losing its momentum and the ghosts 
of self-sufficiency, expansionism and state intervention took flesh anew 
in the last decades of the nineteenth century. Modern imperialism and 
revolutionary changes in arms technology were upsetting the balance of 
power. 
Rising political unrest in Cuba reinforced these rearmament policies 
in Spain.  In  1887,  a  plan was  drawn up for  constructing a  modern 
naval force;  the navy asked for  the construction of three cruisers by 
the national industry. A new shipyard was built to this end in Bilbao, the 
centre of Spain's iron and steel industry. Astilleros del Nervi6n was the 
first  attempt at creating a  modern shipyard to diminish the need for 
imports from France, Germany and Great Britain. And even though its 
overdimensional  installations  and  undercapitalisation  doomed  it  to 
failure, it none the less established a precedent that was followed in the 
future. 
The ties between the bourgeois 'triumvirate' - Catalan textile produc-
tion, Castilian agriculture and Biscayan heavy industry - tightened as 
foreign products threatened to invade their terrain and political and 
social  unrest  made  them  reconsider  the  differences  amongst  them. 
Reserving home markets for Spanish producers should provide a guar-
antee for income, employment and benefits, and so it became the battle 
cry of industrialists and landowners. Clientelism and the remnants of 
other more traditional forms of political control (such as caciquismo, the 
Spanish version of the rotten boroughs and the spoils system) exerted 
on behalf of landowners, the commercial bourgeoisie and the nouveau 
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atist organisation. The Fomento del Trabajo Nacional (Promotion of 
National  Work,  an  association  of Catalan  textile  industrialists  that 
widened their field of political influence to the national arena in 188g) 
and the  Liga Nacional de  Productores  (National  League  of Manu-
facturers, formed around iron and steel industrialists in 18g3) were the 
main regional employer associations early on and created a common 
platform for their new economic policy.  Other intra-regional associa-
tions  were  soon to follow:  the  Spanish Maritime League (lgOO),  the 
National Coal Mine Association (lg06) and the Iron and Steel Syndicate 
(lg07)· 
Profit maximising was  attained by political lobbying.  First,  infant-
industry protection was  requested in order to  overcome initial tech-
nological backwardness and to compensate for  the difficulties  of first 
establishment; little by little, increases in the coverage and scope of these 
measures were asked for  to  defend newly gained market positions or 
situations  in  which  foreign  competition  threatened.  These  policies 
included tariff  barriers, direct benefits, tax cuts or subsidies, preferential 
interest rates,  collaterals for loans,  and administrative favours.  When 
these turned out to be insufficient,  the state mandated consumption 
quotas  for  home  production and subjected  industry to  a  system  of 
regulations, authorisations and record-keeping. Thus, tariff protection, 
administrative intervention and corporatist organisation overlapped in a 
crescendo of nationalist economic policies. 
The  loss  of  Spain's  last  colonial  possessions  - Cuba  and  the 
Philippines - in 18g8 entailed a minor economic loss and a major polit-
ical impetus to economic nationalism in Spain. 'Defeat at the hands of 
a foreign  army becomes a powerful excuse  and a  basic reference for 
identifYing  the enemy and setting the limits  of national image.  This 
helps not only to sanctifY the nation and the national project, but also to 
enhance the nationalistic sentiments and to cement the State's central 
place as the project leader.'3 Political, economic and military regenera-
tion was placed foremost on the political agenda. Rebuilding a modern 
navy fleet, and Spain's imperialist incursion into Morocco between Igog 
and 1925, were both endeavours intended to increase Spain's standing 
on the European stage. 
THE  CONSOLIDATION  OF  PROTECTIONISM 
Spain never came round to applying Article 5 of the 186g Figuerola Tariff 
Law whereby the maximum level of tariff  duties would be 15 per cent. It 132  GABRIEL  TORTELLA  AND  STEFAN  HOUPT 
was suspended on numerous occasions and finally revoked in 18go. In 
December of the following year, Spain took a firm step on the road to 
autarky with the Tariff  of 18g1 and the revocation of most of its bilateral 
trade agreements. When the draft for a new trade agreement being nego-
tiated between Spain and Germany was anticipated as becoming a prece-
dent for tariff reduction via bilateral agreements and the most-favoured 
nation  clause,  the pressure group  of the  industrial  north called  for 
support. Before its approval in the Cortes in 18g4, a lobby of more than 
thirty parliamentarians conducted press campaigns, rallies and continu-
ous political agitation, which led to abandoning this or any further treaty 
that might threaten what a German contemporary observer called the 
'Chinese Wall' of Spanish tariffprotection,4 at least for the time being. 
Two years later, metalworking industrialists obtained the abolition of the 
special duties on railway equipment in practice since 1855.5 A new tariff 
hike in 18g8, a higher and new tariff  in Ig06 and the reduction of the last 
bastion of tariff-free trade - debenture on duties paid for raw materials 
and equipment used in ship-building - in Igog consolidated the 'neces-
sary and sufficient' level of protectionism in Spain.6 
Both the 18g1 and Ig06 tariffs were nominally high tariffs - the highest 
in Europe in Ig06. But they must be considered moderate in terms of 
effective protection; Spain's weak position in trade agreement negotia-
tions forced it to concede partial reductions for the large majority of the 
products it exchanged with its primary trade partners. Few alterations 
affected this trade policy framework up to the Civil War, with only one 
further increase in duties in Ig22, which made Spanish tariffs come to be 
regarded as the highest in the world in nominal terms by Ig26. 
INDUSTRIAL POLICY 
The Villaverde stabilisation plan of 18gg was intended to put an end to 
inflation, budget deficits and large increases in banknote circulation, all 
of which were due to the Cuban war (I8g5-8). The plan imposed the 
principle of a balanced budget, the reduction of public debt and tax 
reform, which were combined with a restrictive monetary policy and put 
a halt to inflation and peseta depreciation. It was totally successful. In 
the atmosphere of price stability that ensued, the agricultural and indus-
trial lobbies kept up mounting pressure for higher degrees of state inter-
vention. 
In Ig07 a Law for the Protection of Industry reserved public contracts 
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Production was created as a watchdog of this new regulation and it soon 
evolved into a back-seat driver of nationalist industrial policy. Two years 
later, in IgOg, a law was passed for promoting maritime communications 
and ship  construction.  This  included  an important renewal  of the 
system of subsidies for shipping and ship-building linked to a step-by-
step reduction of foreign capital and foreign technicians as a precondi-
tion.  That same  year  an industrial  giant  was  born.  The  Sociedad 
Espafiola de Construcci6n Naval- future monopolist of Spanish naval 
constructions and dominant firm in merchant ship-building up to the 
Civil  War  - was  a  joint venture  between  British  armament  firms 
(Vickers, Brown and Armstrong) and several Spanish industrialists and 
bankers. It was intended to carry out the reconstruction of the Spanish 
fleet (after its destruction in Santiago de Cuba and Manila in 18g8),  a 
200 million peseta (some  £7.4 million)  project that had defeated the 
plans for an integrated system of irrigation and water supply for Spanish 
agriculture in the Cortes. 
Perhaps the need for foreign technical assistance dictated the status of 
pseudo-public enterprise that the Sociedad Espafiola de Construcci6n 
Naval  acquired.  Mter the  original  contract  had been completed  it 
received numerous new orders, although these were increasingly condi-
tional on it being able to replace imports. The company invested 267 
million pesetas in twenty years in order to comply with the navy's goals 
of self-sufficiency and the 'nationalisation' of naval defence material -
from submarines to ammunition - in exchange for a constant backlog of 
orders.  7 
The First World War provided a favourable series of circumstances 
for  furthering  the  process  of  economic  nationalisation.  As  Spain 
remained neutral in the conflict, its economy prospered thanks to high 
international prices, underproduction in Europe and lack of competi-
tors.  The process of import substitution received a strong boost from 
shortages due to the war. During these years legislation promoted the 
nationalisation of foreign  assets;  as  a  consequence most of Spanish 
public debt bonds abroad, which drew interest paid in gold, were bought 
up by Spanish citizens who thereby found a refuge against war inflation. 
Tax exemptions also facilitated the purchase of Spanish firms' equity by 
Spanish nationals.8 
Industrialisation by import substitution also received a boost with the 
new Law for the Protection of National Industry, approved in March 
of 1917,  whose general aim was to protect industries which had been 
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normalcy. The protection of the law was actuated through tax exemp-
tions, postponement of tax payments, tax and tariff reductions, prefer-
ential interest rates and guaranteed dividends.  A new official bank -
Banco de Credito Industrial (BCI) - was established in 1920 as the main 
agent of the 1917 Law. The new bank's mission was to channel credit at 
favourable conditions to industrial firms.  InJune of 1918  another law 
decreed that all defence material purchased by the state should be pro-
duced by Spanish firms;  and in June of 1921  the mining industry was 
'nationalised', in the sense that mining companies had to be registered 
in Spain, their foreign employees limited to one third of the total and all 
their equipment had to be manufactured in Spain. All this was less earth-
shaking than it sounds,  as  Rio Tinto, Tharsis and many other large 
foreign concerns went on with business as usual, but it shows the obses-
sion with 'nationalisation' in government circles. 
The exposure to postwar European competition threatened the sur-
vival of many of the companies created during the war. Shallow markets 
and lack of experience originated low economies of scale,  scope and 
speed so that the majority of these firms were not able to compete even 
under the umbrella of the 1906 tariff. Inflation, shortages and specula-
tive hoarding, combined with growing labour unrest, had driven wages 
and other costs up during the war. Price and wage stickiness increased 
the problem of competitiveness, so that additional tariff  protection was 
required and provided by the new tarifflaw of 1922 to guarantee the sur-
vival of the nationalist economy. 
The Primo de Rivera dictatorship (1923-9), far from complying with 
what Wicksell termed as the Pareto-optimum 'benevolent dictatorship', 
provided some degree of political stability, increased the extent of state 
intervention in  economic matters,  and pursued nationalist economic 
policies  further.  One of its  novelties  was  an extensive  public works 
programme. Road construction and maintenance picked up strongly, 
tripling  the  amounts  spent  the  decade  before.  Railway  investment 
quadrupled with respect to the previous decade (the 19IOS) with 31 per 
cent of that investment being financed by public institutions and instru-
ments. The construction of dams and harbour installations surpassed 
all previous levels.9 In an attempt to replace the monarchy's economic 
and political corruption, the dictator strove to create a new corporatist 
structure to substitute for the old order. By July of 1926, Miguel Primo 
de  Rivera  had initiated  a  process  of industrial  modernisation  and 
concentration with growing regulation of enterprises. In  September a 
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growing among policy makers about whether private initiative alone 
could foster growth and development in Spain.  10 
Another distinctive  trait of economic policy under the  Primo  de 
Rivera dictatorship was the expansion of the state banking system. To 
the Bank of Spain (1782)  and the Banco Hipotecario (1872),  the Banco 
de Credito Industrial had been added in 1920 and reformed in 1926 and 
1927.  This was considered insufficient, and several other credit institu-
tions were created. The Banco de Credito Local was founded in May 
of  1925  and  was  oriented  towards  financing  local  and  municipal 
administrations; the Banco Exterior de Espafia was created in August of 
1928 and designed to service Spanish fjrms dealing in foreign markets; 
other minor sectorial credit institutions were created for fishing and for 
agriculture. 
Some of the state monopolies, such as  postal communication, salt, 
tobacco, gunpowder and matches, dated back to the seventeenth cen-
tury.  During the first third of the twentieth century, income from the 
traditional monopolies followed a downward trend and their weight in 
total revenues was declining at the same time. In order to compensate 
for this decline a new monopoly was created: that for the distribution 
and refining of petroleum. This puzzling monopoly (Spain did not itself 
produce a drop of petroleum) was the pet project of  Jose Calvo Sotelo, 
finance minister under Primo de Rivera and one of the most remark-
able economic nationalists in Spanish history. The monopoly, decreed 
in  1927,  was  a  tax-farming device:  the  farmer was  a  newly  created 
company, the CompafiiaArrendataria del Monopolio de Petr6leos S.A., 
(CAMPSA,  or Company for  the  Leasing  of the  Petrol  Monopoly). 
CAMPSA, whose life  extended until Spain's entry into the European 
Union, was a quintessential nationalist creation, explicitly intended to 
prevent Standard Oil and Shell from making profits in Spain and, if pos-
sible, to find petrol in Spain and develop a refining and petrochemical 
industry, a distribution network and so on. In his memoirs, Calvo Sotelo 
relates with relish his cavalier treatment of Sir Henry Deterding, then 
head of Royal Dutch-Shell, when Deterding paid him a visit to try to 
dissuade  him from  establishing the  oil  monopoly.  Calvo  Sotelo  saw 
himself as  the representative of a sm;Ul  but proud nation teaching a 
lesson to an international plutocrat. All in all, it can be shown that the 
oil monopoly was not a good idea. It did not yield as much revenue as 
ordinary taxes could have, the service CAMPSA gave consumers was 
dismal,  and  it  also  produced  exactly  the  opposite  effects  of  those 
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in  prospection  or in risking its  capital in  petrochemicals  or even  in 
refining, and so not only did it drag its feet on all these endeavours, but 
it did all it could to prevent other companies from doing it. 11 
The Second Republic (1931-6)  did not bring about a radical swing 
back to laissez-foire free-market economics but rather continuity in the 
growing interventionism in economic affairs. The priority of the new 
governing groups was to reform the socio-political and economic life of 
Spain but this affected the existing degree of economic intervention to 
a very small degree. It definitely increased the amount of regulation -
especially for labour markets, banking, foreign trade, armaments and to 
some extent railway transportation. The public works programmes were 
maintained or increased.  Even the oil  monopoly was  retained,  after 
considerable discussion. 
In order to face the growing tensions - the economic tensions of the 
Great Depression, the social tensions of inequality and the political ten-
sions of polarisation - Spain was to follow the same path as other nations 
in the first decades of the twentieth century. Russia, Italy, Germany and 
even the United States (the New Deal) had assumed more authoritarian 
systems of economic governance. There was a mounting demand for 
economic and political dirigism and in this the Spanish Republic clearly 
followed the general trend. 
ECONOMIC  POLICIES  IN THE  EARLY  FRANQUIST PERIOD 
Nationalist economic policies  reached a paroxysm in Franco's Spain. 
Even during the Civil War (18 July 1936-1 April 1939) the Franco side, 
who called themselves the nationalists (nacionales), inaugurated economic 
policies  of strong state intervention in the economy,  consciously and 
purposefully imitating those of their Nazi and fascist allies in Germany 
and Italy. These policies were qualitatively different from those followed 
by prior regimes, also quite interventionist, in that the Franco govern-
ment proclaimed total self-sufficiency - autarky - and the development 
of a powerful military industry as its avowed aims. 
Agriculture was  the  area where  these  comprehensive  nationalistic 
policies were first implemented. The body entrusted with the carrying 
out of these  policies  was  the  Servicio  Nacional del Trigo  (National 
Wheat Agency,  SNT). The SNT was  created by the Franquist junta 
during the war, in August 1937, just when the first harvest was about to 
be collected in nationalist Spain. Originally it was designed to exercise 
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extended its purview to all  grains and legumes, thereby extending its 
scope over the largest share of agricultural output. 
The basic idea behind the SNT was that Spain could and should be 
self-sufficient in wheat. The main worry of Franquist officials was that 
there could be a wheat glut. In the early 1930S there had been serious 
fluctuations in the wheat market due to a  number of miscalculations 
under the Primo de Rivera dictatorship and under the republic. Mter 
the shortages of 1931 two bumper harvests in 1932 and 1934 depressed 
prices even further in a domestic market already depressed by interna-
tional conditions. This alarmed farmers and increased their discontent 
and their opposition to  the republic.  In this  context the nationalists 
championed state intervention in order to sustain prices, with the twin 
aims of proving the superiority of their methods and of consolidating 
the support of farmers  to  the Franco side.  The SNT, therefore, was 
charged with purchasing the whole wheat crop at prices fixed by the 
Ministry of Agriculture, of which the SNT was a branch, albeit with a 
considerable degree of autonomy.  The SNT then resold wheat to the 
milling industry at prices also established by the government, and which 
the millers had to accept, since the SNT was the only legal seller of 
wheat. 
The wheat prices established by the government were on the low side, 
for two reasons: first, they did not want the main staple in the diet, bread, 
to be expensive, secondly, since they were afraid of overproduction, they 
did not want to stimulate it with high prices. Their forecast turned out 
to be mistaken: shortages ensued. In order not to sell at low official prices 
(inflation was high during the war, and it continued during the 1940s), 
farmers started sowing other crops that they could sell freely. The SNT 
then tried to gain control over new products in order to prevent farmers 
from evading the agency's control. Soon it was fixing prices even for 
birdseed. The consequence was a general decline of agricultural output 
(at least of officially declared production). Those years were remem-
bered in Spain as the 'hungry years' (los afios del hambre). 
Wheat and corn (maize) harvests remained below their prewar level 
until well into the 1950s.  Wheat output in particular remained at two 
thirds of the prewar per capita volume. Franco's government attributed 
the desperate situation to a 'pertinacious drought' and resorted to food 
rationing. The shortages were partially remedied by food imports and by 
the black market; food rationing and the black market remained active 
until the mid-1950S.  Imports were expensive and difficult during the 
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Axis powers. The isolation of the Franco regime after the war and its 
chronic commercial deficit aggravated the food  situation, which was 
palliated by a commercial agreement with Argentina (1947-8), whose 
dictator, Juan Peran, sympathised ideologically with Franco. The per-
vasiveness of the black market during those years has made some histo-
rians  think that the real  agricultural output was  larger than official 
figures indicate. In any case, the black market was in fact tolerated by the 
authorities, as it was a way of contenting both buyers and sellers. This 
toleration, however, was a tacit recognition of the failure of the regime's 
agricultural policies. 
A question comes to mind: why were these obviously mistaken price 
policies not rectified? In fact they were, but not until the mid-1950S.  If 
rectification did not come earlier this was probably for several reasons. 
First, these policies were ideologically motivated, and the winners of the 
war were not inclined to recognise their errors - all the more so since, in 
a  dictatorship,  popular discontent finds  few  channels  of expression. 
Secondly, the authorities were afraid that letting agricultural prices rise 
would worsen the inflationary situation. And thirdly, the black market 
arrangement was, in the end, agreeable to large landowners, who were 
among the staunchest supporters of Franco; they benefited by selling at 
higher than official prices, and they were the ones who had the means 
to buy the co-operation of the officials and to operate semi-clandestine 
transportation and distribution networks. 
Industrial policies were even more imbued by principles of state inter-
vention, economic isolation and autarky. The man who inspired and put 
into practice these policies wasJuan Antonio Suanzes, a naval engineer 
of extreme views: his radical nationalism had xenophobic overtones, he 
mistrusted economic liberalism, favoured state intervention and consid-
ered industrialisation as being the only way to nation-building and real 
national sovereignty in the world arena. During his professional life he 
had occasion to work at the orders of foreign, especially British, engi-
neers, and developed a strong dislike of them, blaming them for the ills 
of Spain as intruders and agents of hostile interests. 12  Suanzes joined 
Franco's first cabinet and became Minister of Industry and Commerce 
in the early years of the Franco regime and at other times. He remained 
one of the most influential figures in government circles until the early 
1960s. 
Industrial policies and legislation after the Civil War were directly 
inspired by Suanzes, who at that time enjoyed the full support of Franco. 
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period were national economic - and hence political - independence, 
and reconstruction after the ravages of the war. It has been remarked by 
several historians that the Civil War damaged more dwellings than fac-
tories. In fact, in many areas and sectors factories survived the war in a 
better state than they had before the hostilities, because forced idleness 
permitted repairs that were not undertaken in busier times. One could 
safely say that Spanish industry was more affected by obsolescence and 
lack of imported parts than by material destruction during the Civil War. 
At any rate, the obsession after the war was reconstruction and produc-
tion at any price,  while  the ultimate aim was  political independence 
from more advanced nations. Of course, a requisite for national inde-
pendence was thought to be the development of the military industry 
and the exclusion, or at least a strong limitation, of foreign enterprise. 
Early industrial legislation in post-civil-war Spain was intended to stim-
ulate the private sector to rebuild and develop while investing in sectors 
that were  considered  as  preferred  by the  government and keeping 
foreigners away from posts of control. 
These were  the  aims  of two  laws  issued  on 24  October and  24 
November  1939,  which were  accompanied by  some  other ancillary 
measures. The first of these laws (for  'protection and development of 
new industries') proclaimed in its preamble the need 'to redeem Spain 
from the importation of exotic products which can be made or manu-
factured  within  the  realm  of our Nation'.  Its  main thrust was  the 
establishment of a  new category of industries of 'national interest'. 
When a firm or a sector was so declared by the state it automatically 
obtained access to a series of considerable advantages, such as the right 
to expropriate land, to obtain substantial tax reductions and import 
facilities, to receive soft loans, and even to have a minimum guaranteed 
profit. The possibility also existed that the state might declare compul-
sory the consumption by other firms  of the products that had been 
declared 'of national interest'.  The second law (for  'regulation and 
defence of industry') divided industries according to their military value 
and established rigid state controls over the sector: permits were needed 
to establish an industrial firm, to expand it or to change its location. No 
more than 25  per cent of the capital of an industrial firm could be 
owned by non-nationals. The law again gave  the state the power to 
enforce  the  use  of certain industrial products in  the  market;  it also 
empowered  the  state  to fix  prices,  and  to  make  it  compulsory for 
government agencies to purchase only Spanish products. These laws, 
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failure.  What the legislator thought was encouragement of 'national' 
industry turned out to be the kiss of death. Combined with an iron grip 
upon foreign trade, these policies left little margin for entrepreneurial 
discretion. Several other factors explain the lack of industrial response: 
the population was impoverished, savings - and hence loanable funds -
were scarce, and so were petroleum and other power sources; on top of 
all this, the onset of the Second World War introduced an element of 
uncertainty and aggravated the difficulties of provisioning. 
The  Spanish  authorities,  however,  blamed  the  private  sector  for 
industrial stagnation. The decision was  taken to create another state 
agency,  the  Institute  of  National  Industry  (Instituto  Nacional  de 
Industria, 1Nl),  13 which was established by a law of 25 September 1941. 
1Nl was modelled upon the Italian IRI  (Istituto per la Ricostruzione 
Industriale), which had been created in 1933 in order to acquire a large 
share of Italian industrial firms so as to avoid a banking crash, and there-
after became a gigantic public holding of industrial companies. 
The basic ideas behind 1Nl were the following. First, the industrialisa-
tion of Spain was indispensable and therefore had to be attained at atry 
price.  Secondly,  the private sector was unable to achieve the desirable 
level of industrialisation because it was short of the 'spirit of initiative' 
and also because it was only moved by a myopic profit motive and lacked 
the requisite  means of long-term investment.  Thirdly,  reliance  upon 
capital and technology imports had to be rejected because they implied 
'submission to the will of others, foreign intervention ...  Hence the need 
for firm state action, embodied in this case by the Institute [of National 
IndustryJ.'14 The president of 1Nl from its creation until 1963 was, nat-
urally enough,juan Antonio Suanzes. 
Like IRI, 1Nl became a large holding company: its main activity was 
the promotion of, or participation in, industries that its directors deemed 
worthy of support.  From the mid-1940s  one could speak of an '1Nl 
group' of industrial firms  in which the Institute owned a substantial 
share of equity, or all of it. 1Nl specialised in basic industries, especially 
the power (petrol and electricity) and iron and steel sectors. It also had a 
strong presence in transport industries (automobiles, aircraft, ship-build-
ing, aviation), mining, chemicals, metalworking and mechanical manu-
facturing.  Probably the 1Nl firm that was best known abroad was the 
aviation carrier IBERIA, but many 1Nl firms were well known within 
Spain because they were huge by Spanish standards and employed thou-
sands of workers; such was the case of the iron and steel firm Ensidesa, 
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the electricity giant ENDESA, among others. Later on, especially during 
the 1960s and thereafter, 1Nl acquired a series of private firms that were 
on the verge of bankruptcy, such as Altos Homos del Meditemineo and 
Altos Homos de Vizcaya (iron and steel) or Hunosa (coal), which added 
to its  smokestack giants, giving employment to tens of thousands and 
saddling the holding with staggering losses. 
1Nl's effort was gigantic, but it must be asked whether it was not also 
misguided and wasteful. As  has been pointed out,15  Suanzes had 'the 
mind of an engineer', for whom production was an end in itself regard-
less of cost (comparative, opportunity, or otherwise). Martin Acefia and 
Comin point out that it was an 'outstanding agent of import substitu-
tion' during the 1950S but that its 'strategy of autarkic and state-directed 
development led to inefficient resource allocation'.16 It is worth noting 
that in spite of 1Nl's role of import substitution, and in spite of the xeno-
phobia of its president, its propensity to import was also very high; this 
is  logical,  since  autarky was  largely a  myth.  All  in all,  although 1Nl 
contributed decisively to the development of Spain's basic industries, the 
output of these industries was uncompetitive in international markets, 
and this was 1Nl's Achilles' heel. As Dongesl7 put it: 
product costs and prices tended to be high when compared with international 
levels.  Therefore state firms who sold their basic outputs to other industries 
saddled the economic system with a relatively high level of cost ...  This turned 
... in detriment of the international competitiveness of Spanish industry .. . 
In the last analysis, it does not appear that 1Nl may have contributed ... to 
an efficient  functioning  of private  industry or that it  may have  combated 
efficaciously the existence of monopolies. 
The fight against monopoly was another role  that 1Nl could have 
played and never seems to have undertaken seriously. There are several 
studies showing that during the 1940S and 1950S there was a consider-
able degree of monopolisation in Spanish industry. 18 The Spartish state 
contributed to this with its protectionism and with many laws which, on 
the  pretext of economic nationalism,  in fact  restricted competition. 
There are three ways in which a state can fight monopoly: it may legis-
late against it; it may strike down those laws and regulations that favour 
it; and it may use public-sector firms to compete in monopolised sectors. 
Slowly and weakly the Spanish state, from the 1960s on, has employed 
the first two means, with some results. 1Nl could have been the instru-
ment for the third way, and at some times it was touted to be, such as 
when Ensidesa was founded, supposedly to break the monopoly of the 
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competitor in monopolistic sectors, but has often allied itself with its 
would-be rivals to maintain high prices or to obtain government support 
and in several cases it has played the role of a lifeboat for obsolete firms 
which were in trouble after protection had been lifted, by acquiring their 
assets at prices clearly above those of the market or by channelling funds 
to them. Such was the case with Hunosa, which grouped a number of 
uncompetitive coal-mining firms acquired in 1967, and of Altos Hornos 
del Meditemineo and Altos Hornos de Vizcaya, the largest iron and 
steel private firms, which were in fact bought by 1Nl in 1978 and 1981 
respectively,  after having been supported by the state through 1Nl for 
many years (this was called the 'clandestine 1Nl' by journalists).  19 Thus, 
in fact, in this field 1Nl has been doing exactly the reverse of what it was 
expected to do:  not only not fighting monopolists, but aiding them in 
prosperity and in distress. It has thereby contributed to keeping prices 
high and Spanish industry non-competitive. 
The policy of deep state involvement in industry and in agriculture 
required heavy outlays; hence the need for wide discretionary spending 
powers for the state and, therefore, for  a very weak and subordinate 
central bank. The trend towards limiting the independence of the Bank 
of Spain had started with the Banking Law of 1931, and it belonged to 
a general international current generated by the Great Depression and 
the Second World War. The Banking Law of 1931 had greatly increased 
the  control the government had over the Bank of Spain.  This was 
achieved by the appointment by the Ministry of Finance of three board 
members, and by increasing the power the ministry had over the Bank's 
policies, especially the setting of interest rates. Banking legislation after 
the Spanish Civil War followed this same interventionist trend. It was 
consecrated in the Banking Law of 31  December 1946.20 There were a 
series of features in this law that made monetary policy subordinate to 
nationalist agrarian and industrial policies.  Spain was one of the few 
European countries that had never been subjected to the discipline of 
the  gold  standard,  and this  was  confirmed  in  1946,  when  the  link 
between fiduciary circulation and the metallic reserves in the Bank of 
Spain was definitively broken. The bank's monopoly of note issuing was 
renewed and the control of the state over the bank reinforced through 
the direct nomination by the cabinet of the bank's governor, deputy gov-
ernor and five members of the bank's council, plus an extension of the 
means of control that the Ministry of Finance had over the bank's poli-
cies  (veto  power,  amongst others).  The 1946  law also  subjected  the 
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as relates to the establishment of new firms, expansion, and relocation 
(this is  commonly called the 'statu  quo bancario'), and to the setting of 
interest rates. One of the openly stated aims of interest-rate controls was 
to ensure that they remained low, so as to encourage private investment 
and to allow the state to borrow at inexpensive prices. 
The banking law also took exchange-rate policies out of the hands of 
the  Bank of Spain  and into  those  of a  Foreign  Currency Institute 
(Instituto Espanol de Moneda Extranjera, IEME), which in fact was a 
dependency of the Ministry of Industry and Commerce. This permitted 
the government to exercise  strict control over exchange rates, which 
became a key policy instrument. Combined with quantitative controls 
over foreign trade (tariff rates became redundant), exchange-rate con-
trols  and  multiple  exchange-rate  systems  almost  totally  sealed  the 
Spanish economy from international markets at the government's will. 
Insulation from foreign market 'contamination', of course, was essential 
for the autarkic policies of the early years of Francoism. 
NATIONALISATION  OF  FOREIGN  COMPANIES 
Two interesting examples of nationalism in action were the 'nationalisa-
tions' of two foreign firms  of long standing, the Barcelona Traction, 
Light and Power Company and the Rio Tinto Company. The Barcelona 
Traction, familiarly known as 'La Canadiense', had been created in 19II 
by the American engineer Frank B. Pearson; it was the main electricity 
supplier in Catalonia, and the owner of a substantial tramway and rail-
road network in Barcelona and its  periphery.  The distribution of its 
equity was extremely complex, as was the case with other electrical firms 
organised by Pearson.21 Although its seat was in Toronto, Canada (hence 
its popular name), most of its shareholders were British, German and, 
above  all,  Belgian.  Its  controlling packet soon fell  into  the hands of 
SO  FINA, a German-Belgian holding company whose head was Daniel 
Heineman, an American financier with German origins. Due to war 
problems (the  Spanish Civil War and its  aftermath, then the Second 
World War), 'La Canadiense' was unable to pay interest on its debentures 
in the early 1940s, not for lack of cash-flow but due to problems in con-
vertingpesetas into other currencies. 'La Canadiense', whose public rela-
tions policies left something to be desired and whose accounting was 
extremely arcane, found itself pitted against the hostility of the Minister 
of Industry and Commerce in the late  1940s,  none other than Juan 
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and  foreign  intervention  were,  as  we  know,  anything  but  friendly. 
Suanzes'  ideas  were  known  to Juan March,  a  colourful  and astute 
Spanish financier, whose shrewdness and lack of scruples were by then 
legendary. March managed to harp on Suanzes' (and Franco's) extreme 
nationalist convictions to  harass 'La Canadiense' and prevent it from 
paying its creditors. While doing this March was carrying on negotiations 
with Heineman trying to buy SOFINA's shares at a reduced price.  In 
December 1946  Suanzes had made a  speech in the Franquist Cortes 
about 'La Canadiense', where he had referred to the 'possible concomi-
tancies of the [Spanish] red [i.e. republican] leaders, directly responsible 
of enormous crimes and of the injuries suffered by our country', with the 
directors of SOFINA and even with Paul-Henri Spaak, a Belgian politi-
cian who at the time was the secretary-general of the United Nations. 
In spite of all this truculent language Heineman stood fast.  March 
then put into  practice  his  alternative  plan.  Some  of  his  associates, 
owners of a relatively small number of Barcelona Traction's debentures, 
sued the company for bankruptcy on the grounds that it had not paid its 
debt for years. The suit was submitted in a small town, Reus,  to make 
things  more  difficult  to  their  opponents.  A  few  months  afterwards, 
bankruptcy was declared and an administrator was appointed, thereby 
depriving the company's managers of access to its premises, documents 
and so on. Some time afterwards, 'La Canadiense' was declared extinct 
and its  assets sold in auction. They were bought at bargain prices by 
FECSA (Fuerzas Electricas de Cataluna, Sociedad Anonima), a recently 
created corporation whose main shareholder was none other than  Juan 
March himself The president of FECSA was Juan March's son and 
namesake.22  The case dragged in the courts for twenty years and in the 
end the International Court at The Hague was unable to produce a sub-
stantive verdict.  Meanwhile, FECSA's profits had been accruing to its 
shareholders, largely Juan March and his heirs. 
The Rio Tinto Company had been exploiting one of the  richest 
copper pyrite lodes  in Europe since  it acquired it from  the  Spanish 
government in 1873.  Rio Tinto made enormous profits in the period 
from 1884 to the First World War.  Thereafter, with the fall in the price 
of ores in the 1920S, the world depression in the 193os, plus the gradual 
exhaustion of the best veins, the profitability of the company was limited 
to rather exceptional moments of high copper and sulphur prices. After 
the Spanish Civil War, with Suanzes' extreme nationalist principles and 
dislike of Britons on the ascendant, Rio Tinto was viewed in Spain as an 
'economic Gibraltar', a phrase that was often used in the press and in 
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due to the exclusive Britishness of its managers, and to the toughness of 
its labour relations. During the 1940S the Rio Tinto company was sub-
mitted to undisguised pressure by the Spanish government in an attempt 
to 'nationalise' it. The government control of prices, foreign exchange 
rates, and production and export quotas was used to coerce the company 
and induce it to sell. 
There were serious problems in the government approach, however. 
First,  by harassing the main producer and exporter of copper and 
sulphur in Spain, it was hurting the country's economy. Secondly, in the 
dire circumstances of the 1940S,  the Spanish government lacked the 
wherewithal to purchase Rio Tinto outright, and, while it tried to induce 
private companies to help 1Nl in making an offer,  nothing could be 
achieved. Rio Tinto was not as profitable as it used to be, and its future 
depended largely on government policies, a fact which no doubt dis-
couraged potential private investors. NoJuan March appeared on Rio 
Tinto's horizon. The possibility of expropriation was also contemplated, 
but British retaliation and international outrage were feared.  Franco, 
who very much wanted to rescue Rio Tinto, was characteristically slow 
in making a decision, in this case because he thought that delay played 
in his favour,  as the company's value was bound to decline in time. In 
this,  as  in many other things,  he was wrong. After long and tortuous 
negotiations,  Rio Tinto was  acquired in 1954  by a  group of the top 
Spanish  banks,  who,  induced  by the  Spanish  government  and  co-
ordinated by the Governor of the Bank of Spain, purchased two thirds 
of its capital for a rather high price. The reasons for this deal were that 
earlier that same year an offer to purchase Rio Tinto had been made by 
an American company (Texas Gulf Sulphur), and also that the Spanish 
government was afraid that a hard-nosed approach on its part would 
have provoked a second uproar after that caused by the rough treatment 
meted out to the Barcelona Traction Company. Thus the nationalist 
approach to 'nationalisation' of foreign companies was far from success-
ful:  due to the high-handed methods used in the case of Barcelona 
Traction, the prestige of the country was seriously hurt abroad; and in 
order to obtain a political victory, the purchase of Rio Tinto was made 
in disadvantageous conditions.23 
EVOLUTION 
The resounding failure of nationalist policies was apparent in the eco-
nomic stagnation of the 1940S.  Compared to the per capita income of 
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period. The recovery of Italy,  France and Germany after the Second 
World War was swift, whereas in Spain the per capita levels of 1935 (the 
last year before the Civil War) were not reached again until the mid-
1950s.  Ten years  after the end of the Second World War,  the Italian 
index of industrial output nearly doubled its 1940 value; ten years after 
the end of the Civil War, the Spanish index was below the 1935 level. 
The performances cif  France and Great Britain were closer to that of 
Italy: Spain's failure was the exception.24 
Spain started to grow in the 1950s.  This was due to several factors: 
first, the pull of Europe's growth; secondly, a gradual loosening of the 
most extreme autarkist policies; thirdly, the onset of Spanish-American 
co-operation, which started in 1951 and was made firm with the Military 
Base Agreements of 1953. The dismanding of the most restrictive eco-
nomic policies was initiated by a new cabinet in 1951,  which did not 
include  Suanzes  who  was  replaced by two  more  flexible  men  (the 
Industry and Commerce Ministry was split into two); a better manager 
also  became Minister of Agriculture. From then on the SNT started 
paying more realistic prices, and scion the problems were of overproduc-
tion of grains. But in essence, although somewhat mitigated, the nation-
alistic policies remained and their incompatibility with economic growth 
became obvious. Inflation shot up, worker unrest reappeared after more 
than ten years of quiescence, and balance of payments deficits became 
recurrent and menacing. Mter years of hesitation, autarky was officially 
abandoned as an objective in 1959, when a stabilisation plan, drawn up 
in agreement with the International Monetary Fund and the OECD, 
was put into effect. Most quantitative restrictions to international trade 
were abolished, together with multiple exchange rates. A new and very 
protectionist tariff  was installed in 1961, however. A new Banking Law in 
1962  partially removed some of the strongest controls over banking. 
Suanzes angrily  abandoned 1Nl in 1963,  complaining in  a  letter to 
Franco about 'fundamental discrepancies'.25 Thus, slow,  cautious and 
partial liberalisation proceeded haltingly during the final fifteen years 
of the Franco dictatorship. The definitive abandonment of nationalist 
economic policies arrived with the democratic reforms after Franco's 
death in 1975 and the accession of Spain to the European Economic 
Community in 1986. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The balance  of nationalist  economic  policies  in  Spanish twentieth-
century history is  an actively debated topic.  Tariff protectionism has From autarky to  the European  Union: Spain  147 
been defended by some authors and criticised by others.26 The same is 
true of the interventionist economic policies of the Primo de  Rivera 
dictatorship. The extreme nationalist policies of the first twenty years of 
Franco's long rule (1939-75) have few defenders now, although a number 
of Franquist economists  extolled them in  their time.  The issues  are 
extremely complex. There is  no doubt that the twentieth century has 
witnessed not only the highest levels  of economic growth in Spanish 
history (this is true of many European countries) but also Spain's transi-
tion from backwardness to economic modernity. It  is  also true that this 
is the period when economic nationalism reached its highest levels in the 
country.  Some will think that this coincidence implies causation. The 
opposite view is also possible: that nationalist economic policies were a 
hindrance rather than an agent of growth. There is  some evidence in 
favour of this latter view, which seems the most plausible to us:  growth 
was fastest in the periods after the relaxation of the most extreme nation-
alist measures: during the 1960s, after the liberalising policies following 
the stabilisation plan of 1959, and in the 1980s, after further liberalisa-
tion during the transition to  democracy and in the early democratic 
years.  It could even be argued that the recent (1997-8)  high rates of 
growth are the consequence of the further liberalisation that followed 
the arrival of the Popular (centre-right) Party to power in March of 1996. 
Of course the  subject requires and warrants further study.  A careful 
comparison with other countries in similar circumstances (Italy, Portugal 
and Greece come readily to mind) could yield more positive conclusions. 
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